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Essay 
Kelo Ten Years Later: A City’s Unrealized Dream and 
the Destruction of a Neighborhood 
HON. PETER T. ZARELLA 
 In this critique of the essay “Kelo Is Not Dred Scott” written by 
Attorneys Wesley Horton and Brendon Levesque, Justice Peter 
Zarella explains how the authors of that essay, along with the 
Connecticut and United States supreme courts in Kelo v. City of 
New London, overlooked an important distinction in cases involving 
the taking of private property through eminent domain: public 
ownership and control versus private ownership and control. It is 
this distinction, Justice Zarella claims, that supports use of 
heightened judicial scrutiny in cases where property is taken for the 
“public use” of economic development, an approach he advocated 
in his dissent in Kelo. He further expounds on how such an 
approach was supported by the case law of both Connecticut and the 
United States. In addition, this Essay provides a counterpoint to the 
argument presented by Attorneys Horton and Levesque that 
economic development takings should be treated no different than 
other takings by highlighting three ways in which economic 
development takings are different than takings previously upheld by 
the courts. Finally, Justice Zarella refutes the claim asserted by 
Attorneys Horton and Levesque that democracy is an adequate 
check on eminent domain abuse.  
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Kelo Ten Years Later: A City’s Unrealized Dream 
and the Destruction of a Neighborhood 
HON. PETER T. ZARELLA* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Attorney Horton and Attorney Levesque would have you believe that 
Kelo v. City of New London is a story about a distressed municipality in 
search of an economic renaissance.1 They open their essay as the City of 
New London and New London Development Corporation (NLDC) opened 
their brief before the United States Supreme Court: by painting a picture of 
a depressed, seaside city poised to turn around its misfortune. For decades, 
the city had been plagued by economic decline. It had “an unemployment 
rate close to double that of the rest of the state, a shrinking population, a 
dearth of new home and business construction” and its largest employer 
had just closed.2 Moreover, the city’s principal source of funding was 
property taxes, yet fifty-four percent of the property within the city was 
tax-exempt.3 Things were about to change for New London, however. It 
                                                                                                                          
* Associate Justice, Connecticut Supreme Court; J.D., Suffolk University Law School, 1975; B.S., 
Northeastern University, 1972. Justice Zarella was appointed as an Associate Justice of the Connecticut 
Supreme Court by Governor John G. Rowland on January 4, 2001. Prior to joining the state’s high 
court, he served as an Appellate Court and Superior Court Judge. Before ascending to the bench, he 
spent over twenty years in private practice and was a partner in the Hartford law firm of Brown, 
Paindiris & Zarella. 
The views and opinions expressed in this Essay are those of the author and do not reflect the 
position of the Connecticut Supreme Court or the honorable justices thereof. Moreover, this Essay does 
not express the views of the justices that constituted the Kelo panel, including those justices who joined 
in the dissent. 
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Attorney Cody Friesz for his diligent research, cogent 
comments, and hours of research and drafting that made this Essay possible. In particular, Attorney 
Friesz, who currently serves as a law clerk in my chambers, provided great guidance on a topic that has 
no boundaries, by constantly reminding me of the specific focus of this Essay—a reply to Attorneys 
Horton and Levesque. Attorney Friesz is a member of the Connecticut and Massachusetts bars and 
graduated from Suffolk University Law School in 2015. I also wish to express my appreciation to 
Attorney Holly Boots who has served in my chambers as my permanent law clerk for over ten years. 
Attorney Boots worked diligently on the original dissent in the Kelo matter in 2004 and I wish to take 
this much delayed opportunity to thank her for all of her efforts over the years. Attorney Boots is a 
member of the Connecticut and New York bars and received her J.D. from Pace Law School. She also 
has a Master’s Degree in City and Regional Planning from Harvard University. Lastly, I would like to 
thank my Executive Legal Assistant, Elizabeth Hammell, for her editorial support. 
1 Wesley W. Horton & Brendon P. Levesque, Kelo Is Not Dred Scott, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1405, 
1408 (2016). 
2 Id.; see also Brief of the Respondents at 1, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) 
(No. 04-108), 2005 WL 429976, at *1.  
3 Brief of the Respondents, supra note 2, at 1. 
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had recently appointed the NLDC as its development agent, and the NLDC 
had crafted a plan that would generate between $680,000 and $1.2 million 
in additional tax revenue annually and create over one thousand temporary 
and permanent jobs.4 The plan called for the construction of a hotel and 
conference center, office space, and upscale housing in the Fort Trumbull 
neighborhood.5 All that stood in the way of progress were the private 
homes of Susette Kelo and the other Fort Trumbull residents on 
development Parcels 3 and 4A.6  
In reality, however, this is not just a story about New London. Indeed, 
this is also a tale about the courageous battle of Susette Kelo and her 
neighbors,7 ordinary people fighting to save their piece of the American 
dream—their homes. Ms. Kelo and her fellow neighbors resisted the 
condemnation of their homes. When democracy failed to protect them, 
they turned to the courts, challenging the decision of the City and the 
NLDC to use eminent domain on a number of grounds. This Essay will 
address the issue at the heart of Ms. Kelo’s challenge:8 namely, whether 
her home and her neighbors’ homes were taken for a “public use.” As the 
case moved through the court system, Ms. Kelo’s public use argument 
                                                                                                                          
4 Id. at 1–2, 8. The development plan, according to the NLDC, was expected to create 518 to 867 
constructions jobs, 718 to 1,362 direct jobs, and 500 to 940 indirect jobs. Id. at 8.  
5 Id. at 6–7. 
6 The entire Fort Trumbull development area was approximately ninety acres, divided into seven 
parcels. Parcels 3 and 4A made up 9.4 acres of the development property, and the properties of Susette 
Kelo and her neighbors covered 1.54 acres. Brief of Petitioners at 3–6, Kelo v. City of New London, 
545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811059, at *3–6.  
7 Nine individuals, owning fifteen properties, challenged the decision to use eminent domain. See 
Complaint at 1–2, Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 
13, 2002) (No. 01CV0557299S), 2000 WL 35542907. Susette had moved into the Fort Trumbull 
neighborhood in July 1997, about a year and one half before the City and the NLDC approved the Fort 
Trumbull development plan. Id. at 6, 12. Although she had not lived in the neighborhood long, she 
finally had what she always wanted: a place of her own with a view of the water. When she purchased 
the home it was overgrown and had been vacant for years. Shortly after moving in, however, she had 
restored her Victorian home. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 6, at 2. 
Unlike Susette, a number of the other plaintiffs in Kelo had resided in the Fort Trumbull 
neighborhood most of their lives. In fact, Wilhelmina Dery, who was in her mid-80s when Kelo 
reached the Supreme Court, still resided in the house in which she was born. Id. at 1. It was the only 
place she had ever lived. Id. at 2. Wilhelmina’s son, Matt Dery, also lived in the neighborhood with his 
wife and son. Id. 
Bill Von Winkle and Richard Beyer did not live in the Fort Trumbull neighborhood, but they both 
owned property in the area. Von Winkle owned a deli and some rental properties and Beyer was 
renovating two homes in the area. See Complaint, supra, at 10–11, 13. 
Byron Athenian had lived in the neighborhood for about eleven years when he received his 
condemnation notice from the NLDC. He was only four years shy of paying off his mortgage.  
Pasquale and Margherita Cristofaro had lived in the area for decades, moving in after they lost their 
previous home to the city’s eminent domain power. Id. at 10. Finally, Jim and Laura Guretsky were a 
young couple who owned a triplex property in the neighborhood. They lived in one of the homes with 
their two daughters. Id. at 14. 
8 As this Essay is a commentary on Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, it will also try to confine its 
discussion to issues raised in that essay.    
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evolved, but it could always be broken down into two simple ideas. First, 
economic development could never be a public use because it was 
primarily for the benefit of private business.9 Second, if economic 
development could be a public use, there must be some reasonable 
assurance that the taken property would in fact be used for a public use, 
which, she claimed, was not present in this case.10 Unfortunately for Ms. 
Kelo, she could not convince the courts. 
When Attorneys Horton and Daniel Krisch11 prepared to defend the 
City of New London and the NLDC before the Supreme Court, they 
decided to emphasize how similar Kelo was to the Court’s previous 
opinions on eminent domain and public use.12 They argued that the Court’s 
precedent required that it defer to the legislative determination that 
economic development was a public use—and that the power of eminent 
domain could be used to accomplish such development—because the 
takings were “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.”13 
Additionally, the City and the NLDC asserted that there was no 
“principled” reason to subject economic development to heightened 
scrutiny.14 There was no “foundation in either logic or [the] Court’s 
jurisprudence,” they contended, to subject economic development projects, 
or more accurately, the use of eminent domain to accomplish such projects, 
to greater scrutiny than in other takings cases.15   
Ultimately, the Court agreed. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a 
majority of the Court, concluded that developing local economies has long 
been a function of state and local government and that it would be 
                                                                                                                          
9 See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 6, at 11–27 (arguing condemnation for sole purpose of 
economic development not a public use); Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3–13, Kelo v. City of 
New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004) (No. 16742), 2002 WL 34155033, at *3–13 (contending 
taking for economic development is prohibited taking for private, not public, use).  
10 See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 6, at 27 (asserting if economic development is a public use, 
“there must at least be a reasonable certainty that the condemnations will result in [the purported] 
public benefits” derived from the development plan); Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 9, at 
15–19 (claiming takings could not be upheld because no assurance government would continue to 
control development and assure public use). 
11 Attorneys Wesley Horton and Daniel Krisch represented the City of New London and the 
NLDC before the United States Supreme Court. Attorney Krisch wrote the brief. See Horton & 
Levesque, supra note 1, at 1412. 
12 Id. 
13 Brief of the Respondents, supra note 2, at 13–16 (citations omitted) (expounding the Court’s 
deferential standard in Takings Clause cases). Attorneys Horton and Krisch further argued that under 
the Court’s cases, the fact that the property would be transferred to another private party was 
inconsequential. Id. at 24–28. The only question for the Court to determine, they contended, was 
whether the City and the NLDC could have rationally concluded that the condemnations at issue would 
produce some public benefit. Id. at 24. The means by which the City and the NLDC chose to 
implement the plan were not to be of any concern to the Court. Id. at 25.     
14 See id. at 39 (arguing if condemnation is for proper public purpose, the Court does not consider 
whether condemnation will achieve its goals). 
15 Id. at 40. 
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“incongruous” to conclude that the benefits the City expected the Fort 
Trumbull development project to produce were different from, or “less of a 
public character” than, those public purposes the Court previously had 
approved.16 He further insisted it would be a great departure from 
precedent to adopt a heightened level of scrutiny that would allow courts to 
consider whether there was a “reasonable certainty” that the purported 
public benefit would occur in an economic development takings case.17 
“When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means are not 
irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of 
takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of 
socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in the federal 
courts.”18 
I agree with the Court, and Attorneys Horton and Krisch, that declaring 
what constitutes a public use is within the province of the legislature, with 
only a limited role for the judiciary in reviewing such decisions.19 I further 
agree that, under the deferential approach required by case law, economic 
development is a proper public use. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with the 
contention that Takings Clause jurisprudence forecloses any and all 
possibilities of heightened scrutiny by the judiciary in reviewing economic 
development takings. It was possible, within the context of the case law at 
the time of Kelo, for the courts to intervene and question whether a 
particular taking was being implemented or administered for a public use, 
and, further, whether the particular economic development project was 
likely to materialize. I explain how in Part II of this Essay.       
After explaining how the test I proposed in my Kelo dissent is 
consistent with Takings Clause jurisprudence, I address, in Part III, the 
mistaken claim of the Court and Attorneys Horton and Levesque that there 
is no significant difference between economic development takings and 
takings previously sanctioned by the Court. Part IV then answers the 
somewhat naïve contention of Attorneys Horton and Levesque that 
democracy is an adequate restraint on eminent domain abuse and the 
principles of federalism dictate that public use determinations be left to the 
states. Finally, Part V summarizes the major themes in this Essay and 
stresses the importance of a greater role for the judiciary in the context of 
economic development takings. 
                                                                                                                          
16 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484–85 (2005). The majority of the Court saw no 
difference in taking private property for economic development and taking private property for 
facilitating agriculture and mining, clearing blight, breaking up a land oligopoly, and reducing barriers 
to entry in a particular market. Id.  
17 See id. at 487–88 (noting petitioners’ alternative argument and rejecting as foreclosed by 
precedent). 
18 Id. at 488 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984)). 
19 I must note, however, that I agree that the takings jurisprudence requires such deference. I am 
not sure I would reach the same result if I were to answer the question as a matter of first impression. 
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II. TAKINGS CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE DOES NOT FORECLOSE THE USE OF 
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS CASES 
I begin by explaining the approach I applied in Kelo and would have 
applied in all subsequent economic development takings cases. Next, to 
help readers better understand the origin of my test, I will briefly explain 
the evolution of Connecticut takings and public use law. Then, I will 
conduct a concise overview of the relevant United States Supreme Court 
cases on the Public Use Clause. Finally, I will explain how the test outlined 
in Part II.A is consistent with the case law summaries in Parts II.B and 
II.C.  
A.  Clear and Convincing Likelihood of Development 
Relying on early Connecticut cases, I proposed applying a four-part 
test to the takings carried out by the City and the NLDC.20 It is a modified 
version of the third step in that four-part test that the New London 
homeowners asked the United States Supreme Court to adopt. It is also the 
part of the test Attorneys Horton and Levesque characterize as “almost 
impossible to satisfy.”21 That step, which I call the “likelihood-of-
development test,” would have required the City and the NLDC to 
establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the economic 
development plan would actually be implemented and therefore, the public 
                                                                                                                          
20 See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 587–92 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J., 
dissenting), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (setting out more exacting standard for review of economic 
development takings). First, the court would determine whether the statutory scheme under which the 
takings are effectuated is facially constitutional. Id. at 587. Second, if facially constitutional, the court 
would consider whether the primary purpose of the particular economic development plan was for 
private rather than public benefit. Id. at 588. Third, if the statutory scheme is facially constitutional and 
the particular plan is primarily intended to benefit the public, the court would ask if “the specific 
economic development contemplated by the plan will, in fact, result in a public benefit.” Id. Finally, if 
the court finds for the taking party on the first three questions, the court will decide, under the 
deferential standard of review, whether the specific condemnation is reasonably necessary to 
implement the plan. Id. at 591.   
The party challenging the taking will have the burden in steps one, two, and four. Id. at 587–88, 
591. Thus, the challenger would need to prove that the statutory scheme was facially unconstitutional, 
the particular economic development plan was motivated, primarily, by a desire to benefit a private 
person or business, or that the challengers’ property is not reasonably necessary to accomplish the 
economic development plan. Id. At each of these three stages, the court would employ the established 
deferential standard of review. Id. At the third step, however, the burden of proof would shift to the 
taking party. Id. at 588. Moreover, the taking party would have to prove that the plan will result in the 
purported public benefit by clear and convincing evidence. Id. The burden would be satisfied by 
establishing, through clear and convincing evidence, that the plan would actually be implemented. Id. 
at 583, 588. 
21 Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1411 n.39; see also Brief of Petitioners, supra note 6, at 
36–48 (asking the Court to require taking authority prove “there is reasonable certainty that the 
[economic development] project will proceed and yield the public benefits that are used to justify the 
condemnation”).  
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benefits projected to result from the plan and challenged takings would be 
realized. Such a determination was necessary, I felt, because the court 
could not determine whether the economic development project was a 
“public use” without considering whether the proposed development would 
in fact occur.   
A majority of the justices of the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected 
my approach. Additionally, the City and the NLDC urged the United States 
Supreme Court that this heightened standard of review was inconsistent 
with its precedent. The Court agreed.22 My colleagues, the City and the 
NLDC, and the United States Supreme Court justices, however, 
misunderstood my point. They all concluded that legislatures determine, 
with only a limited role for the courts, what is or is not a public use, and 
the courts do not sit to second-guess the wisdom of such determinations.23 
They further concluded that it is not the courts’ role to question whether 
the project will in fact accomplish the City’s goals, such as increased tax 
revenue and more jobs, or to evaluate the accuracy of the projected 
economic outcomes of a project.24 Rather, it is left to legislative bodies to 
determine the means by which they will carry out their objectives. 
My primary concern, however, was much more basic than my 
esteemed colleagues recognized. It was, quite simply, whether there was 
clear and convincing evidence the hotel and convention center, office 
space, and new housing contemplated by the plan would actually be built, 
and therefore, whether the purported public benefits of increased tax 
revenues and more jobs would be realized. If it was clear the construction 
would indeed take place, then the court could conclude the use of eminent 
domain by the City and NLDC was rationally related to a conceivable 
public purpose,25 thereby satisfying the public use requirements of the 
United States and Connecticut constitutions,26 provided, of course, that the 
plan also passed the other parts of the test. On the other hand, if it appeared 
                                                                                                                          
22 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487–88 (concluding that a rule requiring New London to show with 
reasonable certainty that a public benefit would accrue from a taking represented a great departure from 
precedent).  
23 See id. at 483 (“For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed 
rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining 
what public needs justify the use of the taking power.”); Kelo, 843 A.2d at 527–28 (holding 
Connecticut public use jurisprudence was in harmony with federal cases and that the legislature was 
afforded substantial deference); Brief of the Respondents, supra note 2, at 39 (explaining the Supreme 
Court “has been loath to scrutinize a legislative determination as to whether an economic decision 
serves a public purpose”).  
24 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488 & n.20 (explaining courts will not entertain empirical debates 
regarding the wisdom of takings). 
25 See id. at 488 (declaring so long as the purpose is legitimate and the means are not irrational, 
federal courts should leave matters of policy to the legislature (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 
467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984))). 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. V; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 11.  
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the construction was not likely to occur, or at least not within a reasonable 
time, the court would be compelled to conclude that there was no rational 
link between the City’s use of eminent domain and the public benefits that 
would purportedly flow from the economic development project. Without 
such a link, the takings would not be for a public use. With this 
understanding, let us turn to the Public Use Clause jurisprudence.     
B.  Development of Connecticut Public Use Law 
Connecticut law on public use developed in a way that not only 
allowed for application of the likelihood-of-development test in Kelo, but 
invited use of the test.27 Connecticut’s public use jurisprudence begins with 
Olmstead v. Camp, in which the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected a 
narrow construction of “public use” in the Takings Clause of the 
Constitution.28 Indeed, the court held public use “may . . . well mean public 
usefulness, utility or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit; so 
that any appropriating of private property by the state under its right of 
eminent domain for purposes of great advantage to the community, is a 
taking for public use.”29 Additionally, Olmstead set the framework for 
judicial deference to the legislature in determining what is or is not a 
public use.30 The power of eminent domain must be elastic, the court 
                                                                                                                          
27 In referencing Connecticut law inviting the application of the likelihood-of-development test:  
It is for the Legislature to say whether any given use is [a public use] or not . . . But 
the question whether in any given instance the use is or will be administered as a 
public or as a private use is a question which must of necessity be determined by the 
courts in accordance with the facts of the particular case in hand. 
Conn. Coll. for Women v. Calvert, 88 A. 633, 636 (Conn. 1913) (emphasis added); see also Evergreen 
Cemetery Ass’n v. Beecher, 5 A. 353, 353–54 (Conn. 1886) (accepting use of land for burial places as 
a public use in general, but noting such use is not public use when the cemetery is private and the 
public does not have a right to bury there). 
28 See Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, 546 (1866) (declining to adopt defendant’s construction 
of public use which would require that “property must be literally taken by the public as a body into its 
direct possession and for its actual use”). In Olmstead, the owner of a water-powered mill wanted to 
raise his dam, thereby flooding upstream property. Id. at 532–33. The mill was used to grind flour and 
feed. Id. The court ultimately determined the taking of the upstream property was for a public use 
because  
[i]t would be difficult to conceive a greater public benefit than garnering up the 
waste waters of innumerable streams and rivers and ponds and lakes, and 
compelling them with a gigantic energy to turn machinery and drive mills, and 
thereby build up cities and villages, and extend the business, the wealth, the 
population and the prosperity of the state.  
Id. at 551. 
29 Id. at 546. The court concluded that such a construction was consistent with the meaning given 
to public use by other courts, legislatures, and legal authorities. Id. 
30 See id. (“If the public interest can in any way be promoted by the taking of private property it 
must rest in the wisdom of the legislature to determine whether the benefit to the public will be of 
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concluded, in order to meet the ever changing needs of society.31 Defining 
the confines of the power must depend “on the presumed wisdom of the 
sovereign authority, supervised, and in cases of gross error or extreme 
wrong, controlled, by the dispassionate judgment of the courts.”32   
Despite having adopted a broad definition of public use and 
determining the court will defer to the legislature’s judgment of what 
constitutes a public use, the Connecticut Supreme Court did not disclaim 
all responsibility in policing the use of the eminent domain power. In 
Olmstead, the court stated the power was subject to the courts’ control in 
cases of gross error or extreme wrong, and in subsequent cases, the court 
reserved for itself the right to determine whether the actual use to which 
taken property was put was a public use.33 In Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n v. 
Beecher, a cemetery owner sought to expand his burial grounds by 
acquiring adjoining property through eminent domain, which was 
permitted by the legislature.34 In that case, the court noted the proper burial 
of the dead is necessary for the public health.35 The court further 
recognized such burial requires land, and individuals might not always 
want to sell their land for such a use.36 Therefore, “of necessity there must 
remain to the public the right to acquire and use [land].”37 The court also 
said that the use of the land remains a public use despite the requirement, 
in many instances, that a fee be paid to obtain burial rights.38 If, however, 
the cemetery is private and the public neither has nor can acquire burial 
rights in it, then clearly the land is put to a private use and “the proprietor[] 
of the[] [private cemetery] cannot take land for such continued private use 
by right of eminent domain.”39 
                                                                                                                          
sufficient importance to render it expedient for them to exercise the right . . . .” (quoting Beekman v. 
Saratoga & Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 73 (N.Y. Ch. 1831))). Answering what limits the 
legislative power under the Takings Clause, the court wrote:  
The power requires a degree of elasticity to be capable of meeting new conditions 
and improvements and the ever increasing necessities of society. The sole 
dependence must be on the presumed wisdom of the sovereign authority, supervised 
and in cases of gross error or extreme wrong, controlled, by the dispassionate 
judgment of the courts.   
Id. at 551. 
31 Id. at 551. 
32 Id.  
33 See id.; see also infra notes 34–44 (reviewing cases in which the court considers the actual use 
to which the property is put). 
34 See Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n v. Beecher, 5 A. 353, 353 (Conn. 1886). The cemetery in 
Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n was acting under a statute that delegated the power of eminent domain to 
cemetery associations, allowing them to expand their burial grounds. See id. at 551.       
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 354. 
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The court expounded on Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n in Connecticut 
College for Women v. Calvert. The question in Connecticut College 
regarded the constitutionality of a statute granting the college, a private 
school, the right of eminent domain.40 In resolving this question, the court 
accepted and approved of the legislature’s determination that the education 
of women was a public use, noting “[i]t is for the legislature to say whether 
any given use is governmental [i.e., public] in its nature or not.”41 
Nevertheless, the court went on to consider, as it did in Evergreen 
Cemetery Ass’n, whether the use would be administered as a public or 
private use.42 Paraphrasing Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n, the court 
acknowledged not all women’s colleges are open to the public and there 
was no evidence suggesting the public held the right to gain admission to 
Connecticut College.43 The court therefore sustained the trial court’s 
determination that the grant of eminent domain to the college was 
unconstitutional.44 
                                                                                                                          
40 See Conn. Coll. for Women v. Calvert, 88 A. 633, 634 (Conn. 1913). The Connecticut College 
was a private educational corporation formed to educate women. Id. It was managed by a board of 
trustees and the board was elected by members of the corporation. Id. The trustees set tuition fees, 
made curriculum determinations, and established admissions criteria. Id. 
41 Id. at 636. 
42 See id. at 638 (describing how the use of state resources administered privately are of benefit to 
the public to the extent the public uses or has a right to use them); see also id. at 636 (“It is for the 
legislature to say whether any given use is governmental in its nature or not, subject to review by the 
courts only in exceptional cases of extreme wrong . . . . But the question whether in any given instance 
the use is or will be administered as a public or as a private use is a question which must of necessity be 
determined by the courts in accordance with the facts of the particular case in hand.”).   
43 See id. at 638 (“There is no allegation in the petition that the public has or can acquire the right 
to enjoy the benefits of the land sought to be taken, no provision to that effect in the [college’s] charter, 
and the stated corporate purposes of the [college] are not such as to impose upon it, as a necessary legal 
consequence of its corporate character, the obligation of admitting to its courses of instruction all 
qualified candidates, to the extent of its capacity, without religious, racial, or social distinction.”). 
44 In reaching its conclusion, the court summarized: 
[O]ur General Assembly has discretionary jurisdiction to declare any use public 
which is greatly for the benefit of the community, and that this discretion is subject 
to review by the courts only in case of extreme error.   
Nevertheless, there must still remain for the courts, in all cases where the use 
in question is capable of being administered either for a public or for purely private 
end, the question whether the public has or can acquire the right to the use or benefit 
of the property sought to be taken. 
If the property is to be privately administered, and the public has not and 
cannot acquire a right to its use or benefit, the power of eminent domain cannot, 
upon principle and upon authority, be delegated in aid of a governmental use; 
unless, as in the development of the natural resources of the State, a direct benefit to 
the State results from the taking, which benefit continues to exist although the 
property taken be subsequently used for a private use, and then only when such 
benefit cannot otherwise be fully realized. 
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Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n and Connecticut College recognize that an 
important distinction exists in eminent domain cases: public versus private 
ownership of the taken property. When the government takes and 
continues to hold and use taken property there is little reason to question 
whether the property was taken for a public use. A deferential approach to 
reviewing such cases is therefore appropriate. When, however, property is 
taken by a private party, or taken by the government but transferred to a 
private party shortly thereafter, there is less reason to presume the property 
will be put to a public use, and therefore, a less deferential review is 
needed. Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n and Connecticut College recognized 
this distinction and thus employed a higher level of judicial review. Those 
cases require the courts to consider the actual use to which the property 
will be put or whether the property will be administered in a way that is a 
public use, or at least they did prior to Kelo. The courts must query, for 
example, whether the taken property would be open to the public on equal 
terms, to use for the burial of their beloved decedents, or whether the 
property’s use would be limited to members of a particular private group, 
such as a religion or congregation. That the legislature has declared the 
burial of the dead a public use did not excuse the court from undertaking 
such consideration. It is this distinction from which I drew the likelihood-
of-development test in Kelo, where property was taken by a private 
corporation (the NLDC) for transfer to a private developer. In the context 
of economic development takings, I concluded the test required the taking 
party to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the development 
project would actually occur, i.e., the hotel, office buildings, and 
residential space would be built, thus resulting in the increase in taxes and 
jobs that constituted the public benefit.   
C.  United States Supreme Court Takings Clause/Public Use Jurisprudence 
United States Supreme Court precedent regarding public use, unlike 
Connecticut jurisprudence, has failed to recognize the important distinction 
between public ownership and control and private ownership and control in 
takings cases, and therefore, does not expressly invite the application of the 
likelihood-of-development test. The Court’s failure to recognize this 
distinction has resulted in a public use test that lags behind the evolution of 
the eminent domain power, under which property is increasingly taken by 
or for private parties. Surely, there is a difference between taking private 
                                                                                                                          
Id. at 640. Of course, in economic development takings cases, such as Kelo, the public benefit was not 
access to a college education, but instead increased tax revenue and new jobs. Thus, when considering 
whether the actual use to which the property is being put is a public use, the court needs to consider 
whether the property will be used in a way to create the increased tax revenue and jobs. That is, the 
court must query whether the proposed economic development plan will be implemented, thereby 
creating the purported public benefit. 
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property to construct a public road or build a public library and taking 
private property to convey it to a private developer to build private homes 
and private office buildings, with the hope such development will produce 
the public benefits of jobs and increased taxes. Certainly, the latter should 
receive more judicial scrutiny than the former; however, they receive the 
same deference because the Court has never recognized the importance of 
this distinction. It is interesting to note, however, as discussed in footnote 
forty-seven below, the Court once acknowledged this difference. 
Unfortunately, the distinction has been lost to time. Nevertheless, use of 
the likelihood-of-development test is not foreclosed by the Court’s cases. 
Moreover, as will be explained in Part III, economic development takings 
are manifestly different than the takings previously upheld by the Court 
and thus that distinction provides a principled basis for treating economic 
development takings differently. 
In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the Court 
unequivocally rejected a narrow construction of “public use” that would 
require the property be owned by the government or accessible to the 
general public.45 Moreover, the Court signaled any definition of “public 
use” would by necessity be broad and changing with the circumstances 
when it noted: “It is obvious . . . that what is public use frequently and 
largely depends upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
particular subject-matter in regard to which the character of the use is 
questioned.”46 Around the same time, the Court began deferring to 
congressional determinations of what is or is not a public use;47 and by the 
                                                                                                                          
45 See, e.g., Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (“In discussing 
what constitutes a public use, [Clark v. Nash] recognized the inadequacy of use by the general public as 
a universal test.”); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 367–69 (1905) (noting what constitutes a public use 
may change depending on the conditions of the area in which a taking occurs); Fallbrook Irrigation 
Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 160 (1896) (declaring what constitutes public use often depends upon 
facts and circumstances). Early on, the Court found that property taken and subsequently used by 
private parties could, nonetheless, have been taken for a public use because of the benefit the public 
would realize from such takings. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 161–62. For example, in 
Fallbrook Irrigation and Clark, the Court upheld takings of private property to allow for the creation or 
enhancement of irrigation systems so that adjoining landowners could turn their arid lands into 
productive lands. See Clark, 198 U.S. at 370; Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 161–62. Similarly, 
in Strickley, the Court allowed a taking so a mining company could erect an aerial line across private 
property to carry its product from the mines on the mountain sides to the railways in the valleys. 
Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531. The Court was not troubled, in any of these cases, by the fact the property 
would not be owned by the government or open to use by the public. 
46 Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 159–60. 
47 See United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896). In Gettysburg Electric 
Railway, the Court considered whether the taking of land for the preservation and memorialization of 
the Battle of Gettysburg was a taking for public use. See id. at 679–80. In reasoning that such 
condemnations were for public use, the Court stated, “[W]hen the legislature has declared the use or 
purpose to be a public one, its judgment will be respected by the courts, unless the use be palpably 
without reasonable foundation.” Id. at 680. The Court continued to allow Congress to declare that a 
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latter half of the twentieth century, the Court expressly dispelled any 
notion that the same judicial deference would not be afforded to state 
legislative determinations of public use as well.48 The broad meaning of 
“public use” and judicial deference to legislative bodies reached their apex 
in Berman v. Parker, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, and 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. It was these cases, Justice Stevens argued, 
that compelled the result in Kelo.  
In Berman, the Court considered a congressional act that allowed an 
agency to condemn property in blighted or slum neighborhoods in the 
District of Columbia in order for those areas to be redeveloped by 
government agencies and private businesses or individuals.49 Samuel 
Berman objected to the taking of his property, a non-blighted department 
store, arguing the taking was for private, rather than public use.50 The 
Court, however, upheld the taking as a public use, reasoning it is for the 
legislature to determine what is in the public interest and there is no 
exception simply because the power of eminent domain is being used.51 
“The role of the judiciary,” the Court said, “in determining whether 
[eminent domain] is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely 
narrow one.”52 Congress has plenary power to govern the District of 
Columbia, and therefore, according to the Court, it can utilize eminent 
domain to accomplish that object.53 “Once the object [in Berman, the 
governance and welfare of the nation’s capital] is within the authority of 
                                                                                                                          
taking’s purpose was a public use and implied that such declarations would be controlling until “shown 
to involve an impossibility.”  See Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925). 
Interestingly, in Gettysburg Electric Railway, the Court distinguished between takings in which 
the government itself exercises the power of eminent domain and those where the power is delegated to 
a private corporation. See Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. at 680. The Court noted there was little reason 
to fear eminent domain abuse when the government was taking land. Id. It went on to state, however, 
“[i]t is quite a different view of the question which courts will take when this power is delegated to a 
private corporation. In that case the presumption that the intended use for which the corporation 
proposes to take the land is public, is not so strong as where the government intends to use the land 
itself.” Id. It seems the Court has overlooked this distinction in its subsequent eminent domain cases. 
48 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) (“[T]he fact that a state legislature, 
and not the Congress, made the public use determination does not mean that judicial deference is less 
appropriate.”). Although it was not until Midkiff that the Court expressly declared state legislative 
bodies were entitled to deference, its earlier ruling made it clear the Court would follow such an 
approach. See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 160 (reasoning the people of California and 
their elected representatives know the necessity of irrigation better than the Court and such knowledge 
must be given due weight).   
49 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28–29 (1954). 
50 Id. at 31. 
51 See id. at 32 (“[W]hen the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms 
well-nigh conclusive.”). 
52 Id. (citing Old Dominion Land Co., 269 U.S. at 66; United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 
Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946)).  
53 See id. at 31, 33. The Court appears to conclude that the exercise of any congressional power is 
a “public use” under the Takings Clause. Id. at 33.    
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Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is 
clear.”54    
The Court again employed judicial deference in Midkiff. Under 
consideration in that case was the Land Reform Act, adopted by the 
Hawaii legislature.55 The act was designed to redress failure in the real 
estate market stemming from a land oligopoly and proposed doing so 
through a condemnation scheme by which a lessor’s property could be 
condemned and transferred to the lessee for just compensation.56  
Landowners in Hawaii challenged the act, arguing the conveyance of land 
from one private person to another was unconstitutional.57 The Court 
                                                                                                                          
54 Id. at 33. I am uncertain whether the Supreme Court reached the right result in Berman. If it 
did, however, it certainly was not for the right reasons. The Court’s reasoning in Berman is, at best, 
circular. In a case in which it was asked to determine whether Congress had transgressed the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause by allowing a redevelopment agency to take a non-blighted department 
store it held:  
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the 
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the 
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served 
by social legislation . . . .  This principle admits of no exception merely because the 
power of eminent domain is involved.  
Id. at 32. Thus, in deciding whether Congress has exceeded the constitutional limits placed on its power 
of eminent domain, the Court declared that Congress decides the public interest, and apparently 
therefore the limits of eminent domain, subject to constitutional limits. The Court failed, however, to 
announce what those limits are, the very task it was called upon to perform. As Justice Thomas noted in 
his dissent in Kelo, this was a superb example of question begging. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 
U.S. 469, 519 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
That the Court completely failed to answer the question presented in Berman was not the only 
flaw in its reasoning. The Court also seemed to reason that so long as the object Congress wishes to 
achieve is within its powers, then eminent domain can be used as a means to accomplish that end. 
Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (“Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it 
through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means 
to the end.”). This is a perplexing result, as Justice Thomas noted, because the purpose of the Fifth 
Amendment, generally, and the Takings and Public Use clauses specifically, is to limit government 
power. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Berman also appeared to reason that any 
exercise by Congress of an enumerated power . . . was per se a ‘public use’ under the Fifth 
Amendment. But the very point of the Public Use Clause is to limit that power.” (citations omitted)).  If 
Congress can use eminent domain to accomplish any object within its enumerated powers, what 
independent meaning could the Takings Clause have? I should note, similar circular reasoning 
appeared in the Court’s earlier takings cases as well. See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
55 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232–33 (1984).  
56 Id. When the Hawaiian Islands were originally settled, the Polynesian monarch established a 
feudal land system in which control over land was assigned to certain high-ranking families. Id. at 232. 
Around the time Midkiff reached the United States Supreme Court, land ownership in Hawaii remained 
largely concentrated. See id. In fact, in the mid-1960’s it was discovered that forty-nine percent of the 
state’s land was owned by the state and federal government and another forty-seven percent was owned 
by only seventy-two private landowners. Id. Thus, the Hawaii legislature adopted the Land Reform Act 
to dilute the land ownership market. Id. at 233.   
57 See id. at 234–35. 
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upheld the act.58 Primarily relying on Berman, the Court reasoned that 
public use and a sovereign’s police powers are “coterminous” and that 
courts have only a narrow role when reviewing legislative determinations 
as to what is a public use.59 “In short, the Court has made clear that it will 
not substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what 
constitutes a public use ‘unless the use be palpably without reasonable 
foundation.’”60 The Court further noted that it had never struck down the 
use of eminent domain when it was rationally related to a conceivable 
public purpose.61 
A month after Midkiff, the Court decided Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
Co., also based largely on judicial deference to the legislature. Monsanto 
challenged certain provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).62 The challenged provisions allowed the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to use data submitted by 
Monsanto as part of an application to register a pesticide when considering 
subsequent applications to register similar pesticides manufactured by 
Monsanto competitors.63 The data concerned the health, safety, and 
environmental effects of the pesticide and were collected at considerable 
costs.64 Monsanto argued that such use of the data was effectively a taking 
                                                                                                                          
58 Id. at 245. The Court reasoned it was within the state’s police power to regulate oligopolies, 
and therefore, it would not disapprove of the use of eminent domain in exercising such regulatory 
power. Id. at 242.  
59 Id. at 239–41. Many cite Berman, as the Court did in Midkiff, for the beginning point of the 
Court’s wrongful conflation of the police power and power of eminent domain. See, e.g., id. at 237; 
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“More fundamentally, Berman and Midkiff erred by 
equating the eminent domain power with the police power of States. . . .  To construe the Public Use 
Clause to overlap with the States’ police power conflates these two categories.” (citations omitted)); 
David L. Callies et al., The Moon Court, Land Use, and Property: A Survey of Hawaii Case Law 1993–
2010, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 635, 654 (2011) (noting Hawaii Land Reform Act was upheld by Supreme 
Court due to “confusing conflation of police power and public use in Berman v. Parker”). The error of 
the Court’s reasoning in this regard, however, can be traced back to the late 1800’s. In its early cases, 
the Court used the Necessary and Proper Clause, as construed by McCulloch v. Maryland, to uphold 
congressional use of eminent domain. See, e.g., United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 
668, 681 (1896); Luxton v. N. River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529–30 (1894). Although the 
nomenclature was different, the reasoning was similar. For example, in Gettysburg Electric Railway 
Co., the Court said that Congress need not be expressly granted the right to exercise eminent domain to 
condemn property for any particular public purpose. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. at 681.  
Instead, “it is implied because of its necessity, or because it is appropriate in exercising those 
[enumerated] powers.” Id. This reasoning parallels the Court’s current jurisprudence: that so long as the 
legislature’s object is within its police powers, eminent domain can be used to accomplish such object.  
This leaves the Takings Clause with little, if any, independent meaning. See discussion supra note 54. 
60 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (quoting Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. at 680). 
61 Id. (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 
(1923); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921)). 
62 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990 (1984). 
63 See id. at 990, 993 n.4 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D) (1978)). 
64 See id. at 998 (“Monsanto had incurred costs in excess of $23.6 million in developing the 
health, safety, and environmental data submitted by it under FIFRA.”). 
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of property for a private use.65 In deciding that FIFRA accomplished a 
public use, the Court cited the now oft-repeated principle that “[t]he role of 
the courts in second-guessing the legislature’s judgment of what 
constitutes a public use is extremely narrow. . . .  So long as the taking has 
a conceivable public character, ‘the means by which it will be attained 
is . . . for Congress to determine.’”66 The purpose of FIFRA was to lower 
barriers to entry into the pesticide market by allowing applicants to use 
data already collected by others, saving time and money by eliminating the 
need to duplicate research.67 The Court determined that such a 
“procompetitive purpose” was within Congress’ power and that any taking 
for this purpose was a public use.68      
Relying primarily on these three cases, the Court decided Kelo. After 
reviewing Berman, Midkiff, and Ruckelshaus, the Court summarized those 
holdings: “For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has 
wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording 
                                                                                                                          
65 Id. at 999. 
66 Id. at 1014–15 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 33). 
67 Id. at 1015. 
68 Id. After the Court’s decisions in Midkiff and Ruckelshaus, the rule the Court had crafted was 
clear. In essence, it provided that so long as the object the legislature seeks to obtain is within its police 
powers—i.e., the elimination of blight, regulation of markets, economic development, etc.—it would be 
a public use and eminent domain could be employed to accomplish such goal. Because the Court had 
equated the power of eminent domain to the police powers, it established a framework in which the use 
of eminent domain would be reviewed as all economic and social legislation is reviewed: through the 
lens of rational basis scrutiny. That is, so long as the use of eminent domain is rationally related to 
some conceivable public purpose, its use will be upheld by the courts, at least under the federal 
constitution.   
There is no doubt that it is wise for courts to defer to the wisdom of the legislature in regards to 
economic and social policy. The courts are admittedly institutionally ill-equipped to pass on the 
wisdom of such policies. The taking of a person’s private property, however, is not economic or social 
legislation. Moreover, as Justice Breyer noted at the oral arguments in Kelo, rational basis is used when 
reviewing economic and social legislation in the absence of a particular constitutional provision 
designed to secure a particular individual freedom or limit governmental power. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 38, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108). That is not the case 
when the use of eminent domain is in question. Indeed, there is a positive, constitutional protection, the 
Fifth Amendment, targeted specifically at restraining the government’s power to take private property.  
Thus, eminent domain cases are not suited for the same review as economic and social legislation, at 
least not when the government will not itself use the taken property.  
The reasoning that resulted in the conflation of the power of eminent domain with the 
government’s general police powers has another flaw. Surely, the Fifth Amendment does not allow the 
use of eminent domain to be justified only by the fact that it is employed to accomplish some goal, such 
as economic development, that is within a state’s police powers. Such reasoning has never been 
employed when interpreting other positive constitutional protections. For example, the Court does not 
allow the legislature, city council, or police commissioner to determine what a reasonable search or 
seizure is under the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that law enforcement is within the state’s 
police powers. Interestingly, the Court’s cases have created a puzzling dichotomy. The Court will not 
defer to a police officer when considering whether her search of a home was reasonable. When the 
government wants to take that same home, however, the Court will not question the legislature’s 
judgment.  
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legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use 
of the takings power.”69 Then, continuing on to consider the particular facts 
of Kelo, the Court determined that the economic development plan 
“unquestionably” served a public purpose because New London believed it 
would “provide appreciable benefits to the community, including . . . new 
jobs and increased tax revenue.”70 Citing its limited scope of review, the 
Court concluded the challenged takings were for a public use because they 
were a means to accomplishing the economic development plan, a plan the 
city concluded would serve a public purpose.71 Rejecting Kelo’s argument 
that, at the very least, economic development takings call for a more 
searching review by the courts—such as utilization of the likelihood-of-
development test—Justice Stevens argued that such a holding would 
represent a great departure from precedent.72 “When the legislature’s 
purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear 
that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings . . . are not to be carried 
out in the federal courts.”73   
D.  Application of the Likelihood-of-Development Test Was Not Foreclosed 
by Court Precedent 
As illustrated by Parts II.B and II.C above, utilization of a higher 
standard of scrutiny, such as the likelihood-of-development test, in cases 
involving economic development takings is not prohibited by either 
Connecticut or United States supreme courts precedent. In fact, both courts 
expressly reserve some role for the judiciary in enforcing the public use 
requirements of the federal and state constitutions.74 Indeed, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court has said: “[w]hether the purpose for which a 
statute authorizes the condemnation of property constitutes a public use is, 
in the end, a judicial question to be resolved by the courts.”75 Similarly, the 
United States Supreme Court has held that the judiciary has a narrow role 
                                                                                                                          
69 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005). 
70 Id. at 483–84.  
71 Id. at 484. 
72 Id. at 487–88. 
73 Id. at 488 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984)). 
74 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984) (“The role of the courts in 
second-guessing the legislature’s judgment of what constitutes a public use is extremely narrow.”); Old 
Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925) (“Congress has declared the purpose to be 
a public use . . . Its decision is entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility.”); 
Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606 (1908) (“The one and only principle in which all 
courts seem to agree is that the nature of the uses, whether public or private, is ultimately a judicial 
question.” (emphasis added)); Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, 104 A.2d 365, 369 (Conn. 1954) (holding 
what constitutes public use is ultimately a judicial question). 
75 Gohld Realty Co., 104 A.2d at 369. The Gohld court went on to explain that although whether a 
particular condemnation is for a public use is ultimately a question for the court, great weight must be 
given to the legislature’s determination of public use. Id. 
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in public use determinations.76 Although the Court held the judiciary’s task 
was narrow in the realm of public use determinations, it did not completely 
disclaim court responsibility in this area.77 Presumably, both courts carved 
out a place for the judiciary because they could imagine instances where 
the legislature might extend the power of eminent domain beyond its 
rightful bounds, or cases in which the use of eminent domain was at its 
outer-bounds, necessitating a closer look by the court. Taking private 
property for economic development, in which the property is transferred to 
a private developer and the public benefit to be realized, if any, depends 
solely on the actions (or inactions) of such developer, is an example of a 
taking at the outer-bounds of “public use” and the eminent domain power. 
Moreover, as evidenced by the discussion in Part II.B above, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, despite its broad definition of public use and 
deferential standard, has not historically viewed its role in takings cases as 
limited to determining whether “the appropriate legislative authority 
rationally has determined” that the proposed use will promote a public 
benefit.78 Instead, it has acknowledged that the public use test needs to take 
account of the evolution of the power and use of eminent domain by 
recognizing the difference between government takings and use of 
property and private takings and use of property. Therefore, when the 
taking is done by a private party or the taken property will be put to use by 
a private party, the court has reserved for itself the right to determine, 
based upon the facts of a specific case, whether a particular taking is being 
administered or implemented in a public way; that is, it considers the 
actual use to which the property is put. Such an approach does not require 
the court to second-guess legislative determinations of public use. In fact, 
in Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n the court accepted the legislature’s 
conclusion that operating a cemetery was a public use,79 and in 
Connecticut College for Women it approved of the legislative declaration 
that the higher education of women constitutes a public use.80 Moreover, in 
neither case did the court question or second-guess the general method 
chosen by the legislature to effectuate the declared public uses. The court 
did not opine on the wisdom of using eminent domain by cemeteries to 
assemble land for burial or by women’s colleges for building education 
facilities. Instead, the court’s concern centered around how, in those 
particular cases, the use was actually to be implemented or administered 
                                                                                                                          
76 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“The role of the judiciary in determining 
whether [the eminent domain] power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow 
one.”). 
77 Id.  
78 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 531 (2004), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
79 Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n v. Beecher, 5 A. 353, 353 (Conn. 1886).  
80 Conn. Coll. for Women v. Calvert, 88 A. 633, 636 (Conn. 1913).  
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and whether it would, in fact, be public.81 Having concluded that there was 
no evidence to suggest that the public had or could gain a right, on equal 
terms, to access the cemetery in Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n or the college 
in Connecticut College for Women, the court concluded that, despite the 
proposed uses and the way in which they were to be carried out being 
generally public in nature, they were, in fact, not public in those specific 
instances.82 Thus, these cases not only allow for but invite the use of the 
likelihood-of-development test in economic development takings to 
determine whether the property taken will in fact be administered for a 
public use. In the context of economic development takings, that will 
largely entail considering whether there is clear and convincing evidence 
that the proposed development will be built.  
Although the United States Supreme Court’s public use jurisprudence 
did not invite the use of the likelihood-of-development test in the same 
manner as Connecticut law, it certainly did not prohibit its use.83 The fact 
that the Court so concluded demonstrates that it completely missed the 
point. In asking whether or not there is some level of certainty that an 
economic development plan will actually materialize, courts would not 
second-guess legislative declarations that economic development is a 
public use and that eminent domain can therefore be used to accomplish 
such development. Nor would the court be required to pass on the wisdom 
of any particular development plan or the accuracy of the projected 
economic benefits to be realized from such plan. Instead, the court would 
consider whether there are any facts that indicate the actual plan—not the 
plan’s purported public benefits—will materialize. The court would look 
for clear and convincing evidence that the structures called for in the plan, 
whether they be industrial parks, commercial office buildings, retail space, 
or residential housing, will be constructed and sold, rented, or leased in a 
reasonable amount of time. Attorneys Horton and Levesque contend that 
this will be a hard test to meet.84 They are undoubtedly correct, but the test 
is exacting for good reason: the government is taking the private homes 
and businesses of citizens in order to replace them with facilities to be used 
by other private parties. As I explained in my dissent in Kelo, this is not the 
only area in which the government is required to meet a high burden of 
                                                                                                                          
81 See Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n, 5 A. at 353–54; Conn. Coll. for Women, 88 A. at 636, 638–39.  
82 See Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n, 5 A. at 353–54 (stating that a strictly private cemetery 
association could not take land for continued private use by right of eminent domain, even though it 
was offering burial acreage for public use); Conn. Coll. for Women, 88 A. at 638 (reasoning that despite 
the fact that giving women higher education is a use that is governmental in nature, there are many 
colleges for the higher education of women at which the public cannot obtain the right to be educated, 
and that land cannot be acquired through eminent domain for this continued private use).  
83 See supra note 74. 
84 See Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1411 n.39.  
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proof before depriving a person of a constitutional right.85 Although the 
test is exacting, it is not hard to imagine many instances where it could be 
met by the taking authority. For example, the taking party could satisfy its 
burden by presenting evidence of commencement and completion dates, a 
construction schedule, committed financing, tenant commitments, or a 
signed development agreement that includes conditions for project 
completion. Surely, if under the circumstances there is no evidence that the 
plan will actually be carried out, then the takings cannot be for a public 
use.   
I recognize that the United States Supreme Court previously has 
acknowledged that a legislative plan involving the use of eminent domain 
may not always accomplish its goals, and that such a possibility does not 
change the analysis.86 “The proper inquiry before the Court is not whether 
the provisions in fact will accomplish their stated objectives. [The Court’s] 
review is limited to determining that the purpose is legitimate and that [the 
legislature] rationally could have believed that the provisions would 
promote that objective.”87 The likelihood-of-development test, however, 
addresses a distinct question. Moreover, determining whether the 
development is probable is an indispensable part of evaluating whether the 
legislature could rationally believe the use of eminent domain would 
promote the economic development.   
First, whether the economic development plan adopted by the City of 
New London will generate the number of jobs and tax dollars it projects is 
not the primary concern of the likelihood-of-development test. Instead, the 
test focuses on the much more fundamental point of whether the plan will 
be implemented. At the time of the takings in Kelo there were a number of 
factors that indicated the plan would not move forward, at least not at that 
time. For example, “at the time of the takings, there was no signed 
agreement to develop the properties, the economic climate was poor and 
the development plan contained no conditions pertaining to future 
development agreements that would ensure achievement of the intended 
public benefit.”88 In fact, the development plan acknowledged that current 
commercial rent levels did not support the construction of new office space 
                                                                                                                          
85 See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 588–90, 590 n.19 (2004) (Zarella, J., 
dissenting), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (listing cases requiring clear and convincing evidence). For 
example, clear and convincing evidence is required to prove a claim of adverse possession, for a 
nonparent to obtain visitation rights, to terminate parental rights, and to take a minor’s testimony 
outside the presence of a criminal defendant. See id. at 589–90.  
86 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984) (stating that the Land Reform Act 
of 1967 may not be successful in achieving its aims, but the efficacy of the statute’s relevant provisions 
is not the question to decide; the constitutional requirement is satisfied if the state legislature rationally 
could have believed that the Land Reform Act would promote is objective).  
87 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1015 n.18 (1984).  
88 Kelo, 843 A.2d at 596 (Zarella, J., dissenting).  
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and trial testimony showed that other office space in the area was vacant.89   
Second, a court cannot determine whether the use of eminent domain 
is a rational means to accomplish an economic development plan without 
first determining whether the plan will be pursued or achieved. If, at the 
time of a taking, the presumption is that development will not move 
forward unless and until there is an increased demand for office space and 
an uptick in economic conditions, then the taking of private property, 
particularly a person’s home, to accomplish such development is irrational. 
It is not the property that is needed to accomplish the economic 
development. Instead, a change in the economic environment is necessary. 
Taking the property will not produce such change. For example, if the 
property in the Fort Trumbull neighborhood was simply to be taken and 
cleared while the development project idled, awaiting an increased demand 
for office space in New London or more favorable economic conditions, 
then it seems that there could be no rational conclusion that the taken 
property was being put to a public use. Thus, asking whether the proposed 
use will in fact occur is part and parcel to deciding whether the city 
“rationally could have believed that the [development plan] would promote 
its objective.”90  
III. THE VERY NATURE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
TAKINGS MAKES THEM DISTINCTIVE 
Contrary to the contentions of Attorneys Horton and Levesque and the 
conclusion of the Court in Kelo, the facts in Kelo were not so similar to 
previous Supreme Court cases that there was no “principled way of 
distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes that 
[the Court had] recognized.”91 I can think of at least three principled ways 
to distinguish the Kelo takings.   
First, in the types of takings previously approved by the Court, the 
“public use” occurs either simultaneously with the taking or shortly 
                                                                                                                          
89 See Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238, at *66 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 
13, 2002) (noting how historical values of Class A office buildings had not recovered sufficiently to 
justify new construction except for use by end users, and referencing a 2001 report stating that new 
office building construction is generally not feasible), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 
2004), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
90 See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242 (emphasis omitted). In Midkiff, the Court was not concerned with 
whether the Land Reform Act would achieve its objective of correcting the market failure caused by 
the land oligopoly. Instead, the proper question was whether Hawaii’s legislature could have 
reasonably believed that the act would achieve such a goal. See also Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1015 
n.18 (noting whether congressional act will reduce barrier to entry in pesticide industry is 
unimportant—what was important was whether Congress could rationally have so concluded). 
91 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005). The Court posited that it would be 
“incongruous” to suggest a difference exists between taking for economic development and taking to 
facilitate agriculture and mining, the transformation of a blighted neighborhood, breaking up a land 
oligopoly, and the elimination of a barrier to entry. Id. at 484–85. 
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thereafter by the volition of the government and not an independent private 
actor or some other uncontrollable outside factor, such as the economy. 
The public use in Berman, and other redevelopment cases, is accomplished 
when the blight and the conditions that caused it are removed.92 It is true 
that the government does not always remove the blight itself.93 
Nevertheless, by leasing or selling the taken property to accomplish the 
removal of the blight and the conditions that cause blight, the government 
ensures that the public use is attained. What a private individual or 
business does with the property after the blight is removed, although 
important, is of little concern in the public use determination because the 
public use has already been accomplished. Contrarily, when property is 
taken in connection with an economic development plan, what a private 
developer does with such property after any existing structures are 
removed is central to the question of whether the property will in fact be 
put to a public use. If the property is to be immediately developed into a 
large office complex that will attract new business, thereby creating new 
jobs and increasing tax revenue, it most certainly will be put to a public 
use. If, on the other hand, the property is to remain barren and unused until 
the developer receives commitments from enough end users to justify 
building the complex, it cannot be said when, if ever, the property taken for 
a concededly public use—economic development—will be put to such use.    
In similar fashion, the public use occurred at the time of the takings in 
Midkiff, Ruckelshaus, and National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston & 
Maine Corp., not sometime thereafter. The purported public use in 
Midkiff—breaking up the land oligopoly—occurred when the state housing 
authority took the lessor’s land and transferred it to the lessee, diluting the 
concentration of the state’s land controlled by the lessor.94 Likewise, the 
EPA’s taking and use of Monsanto’s health, safety, and environmental data 
when reviewing a subsequent application for registration of a pesticide 
accomplished the public use of eliminating a barrier to entry of the 
pesticide industry—the costly and time consuming research required for 
registration.95 Finally, the public use of facilitating Amtrak rail service was 
attained when the Interstate Commerce Commission condemned railroad 
track that Boston & Maine had allowed to fall into disrepair and transferred 
                                                                                                                          
92 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954) (observing Congress’ finding that assembly of 
real property for purposes of redevelopment, i.e., removal of blight and slum conditions, is a public 
use); see also, e.g., County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Mich. 2004) (noting in 
redevelopment cases “the act of condemnation itself, rather than the use to which the condemned land 
eventually would be put, was a public use”). 
93 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 30 (explaining redevelopment agency transfers property to other 
public agencies or “redevelopment companies, individuals, or partnerships” for redevelopment 
(emphasis added)). 
94 See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233–34, 242. 
95 See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1014–15.  
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it to another rail company under the condition that it restore the tracks to an 
acceptable condition.96  
The second way to distinguish the takings in Kelo is that the takings 
previously condoned by the Court have natural limitations. For example, in 
order to take property under a redevelopment plan, such as in Berman, the 
property has to be located in an area that is either “slums” or “blighted,”97 
and in Midkiff, takings were to be limited to the estates of the large 
landowners.98 The takings approved in Kelo, however, have no natural 
limitation.99 Instead, any property can be taken if a legislative body 
rationally concludes it could be used to promote the economic 
development of the community. Under the principles of Kelo, no piece of 
property, blighted or pristine, home or business, is outside the sovereign’s 
power of eminent domain.  
Third, as noted in Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo, the pre-
                                                                                                                          
96 See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 412, 422–23 (1992). 
Boston & Maine Corporation owned a portion of railroad track that Amtrak used to provide rail service 
between Montreal and Washington, D.C. Id. at 411. Amtrak had the right to use the track under an 
agreement between it and Boston & Maine, which required Boston & Maine to maintain the tracks. Id. 
Over time, however, Boston & Maine entered bankruptcy and was purchased by Guilford 
Transportation Industries, Inc.; Amtrak claimed this purchase led to track maintenance neglect, delays 
in rail service, and the eventual suspension of the Montrealer service. Id. at 412. Amtrak attempted to 
negotiate better maintenance, but when those negotiations were unsuccessful, it requested that the 
Interstate Commerce Commission condemn the tracks. Id. at 412–13. Amtrak would then transfer the 
railway to a third-party railroad, under an agreement that would require the third-party railroad to 
restore and maintain the tracks to Amtrak’s standards. Id. at 412.    
It must be noted that in addition to the public use occurring in National R.R. Passenger Corp. at 
the time of the taking as discussed above, the taking also involved a fundamental and long-time public 
use, the facilitation of rail service. See, e.g., 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 85 (2014) (“[L]and can 
be condemned for intercity-rail-passenger service where it can be shown that the taking is necessary for 
that purpose.”).   
97 See, e.g., Berman, 348 U.S. at 28–29 (outlining a provision of the District of Columbia 
Redevelopment Act providing for elimination of slum, blighted, and substandard housing conditions); 
Aposporos v. Urban Redevelopment Comm’n, 790 A.2d 1167, 1177 (Conn. 2002) (“[U]nder the 
redevelopment act, it is only with reference to a redevelopment area, i.e., a blighted area, ‘that a local 
redevelopment agency is authorized to . . . take private property by condemnation.’” (citing Gohld 
Realty Co. v. Hartford, 104 A.2d 365, 369 (Conn. 1954))). 
98 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233. The Land Reform Act provides that tenants living in lots situated on 
large development tracts of land can petition to have the land condemned. Id. The state housing 
authority will then consider whether transferring the property to the tenants would serve the purpose of 
breaking up the oligopoly. Id. at 233–34. 
99 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 504–05 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“Today nearly all real property is susceptible to condemnation on the Court’s theory. . . . ‘[N]ow that 
we have authorized local legislative bodies to decide that a different commercial or industrial use of 
property will produce greater public benefits than its present use, no homeowner’s, merchant’s or 
manufacturer’s property, however productive or valuable to its owner, is immune from condemnation 
for the benefit of other private interests that will put it to a ‘higher’ use.’” (quoting Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 464 (Mich. 1981))); Sw. Ill. Dev. Authority 
v. Nat’l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. 2002) (noting that all lawful business incidentally 
contributes to regional economic growth). 
 2016] KELO TEN YEARS LATER 1541 
condemnation use of the property taken in Berman and Midkiff was 
harmful to the public.100 The redevelopment area in Berman had 
deteriorated and become a health and safety risk to the public.101 Of course, 
Berman’s department store was not itself blighted and therefore the use of 
his specific piece of property was not a public harm. Such narrow thinking, 
however, misses the forest for the trees. The danger to the public health 
and safety was caused by the area, not any one individual piece of 
property, and Congress concluded the way to remediate that harm was to 
redevelop the entire area and remove the conditions which caused the 
blight, thereby necessitating, in its mind, the taking of Berman’s store. In 
Midkiff, the concentrated ownership of land had caused the residential fee 
simple market to fail, and in National Railroad Passenger Corp., the 
neglected tracks produced a public harm by causing the suspension of 
Amtrak service between Washington, D.C., and Montreal. In Kelo, on the 
other hand, the property owners’ use of the land was not harmful.102 
Susette Kelo and the others did not cause the depressed economic 
conditions in New London by using their property for homes. Neither were 
their homes deteriorating nor the neighborhood blighted.103 In fact, many 
of the property owners who wished to stay in the Fort Trumbull 
neighborhood had expended considerable time and money maintaining 
their homes.104   
I therefore contend that the City and the NLDC were wrong in arguing, 
and the Court was mistaken in concluding, that there was no difference 
between the economic development takings at issue in Kelo and those 
takings previously addressed by the Court. There are in fact significant 
distinctions and it is those differences that require the courts to take on a 
more meaningful role in protecting private property rights in the context of 
economic development takings.   
IV. DEMOCRACY PLACES NO MEANINGFUL LIMIT ON EMINENT 
DOMAIN AND ENFORCING THE PUBLIC USE CLAUSE DOES NOT 
OFFEND THE PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM 
Attorneys Horton and Levesque argue in their essay,105 as was argued 
before the Court,106 that the democratic process, not some court-created 
                                                                                                                          
100 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
101 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 28–29, 30–31 (outlining congressional act allowing condemnation of 
blighted areas and describing particular area at issue in Berman).  
102 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
103 Id. at 475 (majority opinion). 
104 Id.  
105 See Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1425 (averring democratic process should make 
public welfare decisions and electorate will serve as check for unpopular condemnations). 
106 See Brief of the Respondents, supra note 2, at 21 (contending Court institutionally ill-suited to 
determine public use because removed from democratic process). 
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and administered standard, is the proper limit on public use determinations 
and adequately protects property owners from eminent domain abuse. Such 
a contention, however, plainly ignores reality. When the legislature is left 
to determine public use, the risk that the majority will abuse the political 
process to capture the power of eminent domain and use it against the 
interests of less powerful minorities intensifies.107 The Framers must have 
had such abuse in mind when they drafted the Takings Clause. Likewise, 
democracy also can be an insufficient protection for the majority when 
legislatures or local governments are captured by powerful interest groups 
that persuade the members of those bodies to use eminent domain to 
accomplish their goals.108 
History in fact has shown majoritarian oppression in the use of eminent 
domain, in that takings have disproportionately affected minority, elderly, 
and poor neighborhoods. Between 1949 and 1973, under the guise of urban 
renewal, 2,532 redevelopment projects were undertaken in 992 cities 
across the country.109 As a result of those projects, one million individuals 
were displaced.110 Two-thirds of the displaced individuals were African-
Americans, at a time when African-Americans made up only twelve 
percent of the United States population.111 This trend continues today. In a 
survey of 184 development projects in which eminent domain was used or 
threatened between 2003 and 2007, it was discovered that a greater 
percentage of the residents in the project areas, vis-à-vis the surrounding 
communities, were minorities, less educated, and economically 
                                                                                                                          
107 See Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for 
Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 547 (2006) (observing 
many African-American and poor neighborhoods were destroyed under the auspices of urban renewal). 
108 Id. at 547–48 (positing outrage after Kelo was driven by appearance of powerful minority 
“tak[ing] control of the machinery of eminent domain” to enrich itself at the expense of a powerless 
minority). Cohen notes that this can particularly be a problem when the taking targets a small number 
of condemnees. Id. at 547. Further, the specter of a powerful minority taking the property of a 
powerless minority is likely to always be true in the context of takings for economic development, 
where the objective is to increase tax revenue or create jobs by putting the taken property to more 
productive use. Id. at 548; see also, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The 
beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political 
process, including large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the government now 
has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more.”).     
109 MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, INST. FOR JUSTICE, 1 EMINENT DOMAIN & AFRICAN 
AMERICANS: WHAT IS THE PRICE OF THE COMMONS? 2 (2007), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 
03/Perspectives-Fullilove.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5YJ-JY84]. 
110 Id.  
111 Id. Another commentator has noted that between 1949 and 1963, seventy-eight percent of the 
120,000 families displaced by urban renewal were nonwhite. Josh Blackman, Equal Protection from 
Eminent Domain: Protecting the Home of Olech’s Class of One, 55 LOY. L. REV. 697, 703 (2009).  
Justice Thomas gave a slightly different statistic for the same period, stating approximately 177,000 
families were displaced by urban renewal and of those families whose race was known, sixty-three 
percent were nonwhite families. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting).    
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disadvantaged.112     
This impact pervaded takings cases before the courts as well. For 
example, in Berman, the Court acknowledged that African-Americans 
made up 97.5 percent of the 5,012 residents that would be displaced by the 
Southwest Washington, D.C., redevelopment project it upheld in that 
case.113 Similarly, in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, a 
neighborhood comprised largely of first- and second-generation Polish-
Americans was cleared to make way for a new General Motors factory.114 
In order to clear an area for the GM plant, 1,176 structures had to be 
destroyed and 3,438 people were displaced.115 Moreover, one amicus 
curiae brief informed the Court of a number of development projects, 
ongoing at the time of Kelo, that disproportionately affected minorities.116 
Such examples included a project in San Jose, California, in which ninety-
five percent of the targeted properties were Hispanic or Asian owned and 
an economic development area in Ventnor, New Jersey, that encompassed 
forty-percent of the city’s Latino population.117  
Additionally, it is not difficult to imagine that in a city plagued by 
years of economic decline, an unemployment rate twice that of the state, 
and a lower-than-average median income, those who oppose an economic 
development plan requiring the condemnation of their homes will find little 
support from their fellow city residences who are hoping for an economic 
resurgence. Justice Ryan suggested as much in his Poletown dissent when 
he said:   
As the new plant site plans were developed and 
announced . . . and the demolitionist’s iron ball razed 
neighboring commercial properties such as the already 
abandoned Chrysler Dodge Main plant, a crescendo of 
                                                                                                                          
112 See Dick M. Carpenter & John K. Ross, Testing O’Connor and Thomas: Does the Use of 
Eminent Domain Target Poor and Minority Communities?, 46 URB. STUD. 2447, 2453, 2455 (2009). 
The project areas residents were 58% minority, compared to 45% in the surrounding communities. Id. 
at 2455. Moreover, a greater percentage of project areas residents held less than a high school diploma, 
relative to the surrounding community—34% and 24%, respectively—and only 9% of project areas 
residents, compared to 13% of residents in the surrounding communities, had bachelor’s degrees. Id. 
The median income of residents residing in the project areas ($18,935.71) was also lower than the 
median income of the surrounding communities ($23,113.46), and a greater percent of project areas 
residents lived below the poverty line, 25% compared to 16% in the surrounding communities. Id. The 
survey of these projects further concluded that the difference in the above categories is statistically 
significant. Id.  
113 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30 (1954). 
114 304 N.W.2d 455, 470 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting), overruled by County of Wayne v. 
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).   
115 Id. at 464 n.15 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). 
116 See Brief of NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9–11, Kelo, 545 U.S. 
469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811057, at *9–11. 
117 See id. at *10. 
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supportive applause sustained the city and General Motors 
and their purpose. Labor leaders, bankers, and 
businessmen . . . were joined by radio, television, newspaper 
and political opinion-makers in extolling the virtues of the 
bold and innovative fashion in which, almost overnight, a 
new and modern plant would rise from a little known inner-
city neighborhood of minimal tax base significance. The 
promise of new tax revenues, retention of a mighty GM 
manufacturing facility in the heart of Detroit, new 
opportunities for satellite businesses, retention of 6,000 or 
more jobs, and concomitant reduction of unemployment, all 
fostered a community-wide chorus of support for the project. 
It was in such an atmosphere that the plaintiffs sued to enjoin 
the condemnation of their homes.118  
Later in his dissent, Justice Ryan noted, “[v]irtually the only discordant 
sounds of dissent have come from the minuscule minority of citizens most 
profoundly affected by this case, the Poletown residents whose 
neighborhood has been destroyed.”119 Justice Ryan’s inclination was 
supported by a study done by three political scientists who concluded a 
majority of Detroit voters likely supported the project.120  
In addition to the difficulty the condemnees may have in garnering 
public sympathy for the loss of their homes in the face of a plan that 
promises an economic renaissance, it is unlikely the democratic process 
will hold municipal leaders accountable.121 There are many reasons why 
local politicians are likely to go unpunished for poor economic 
development plans and abuse of the power of eminent domain. First, the 
cost-benefit analysis in economic development projects is complex and 
many voters may be unable, on their own, to determine whether or not a 
project is cost-effective.122 Second, the benefits of these projects—
increased tax revenues and jobs or a healthier overall local economy—take 
years to materialize, if they ever do, and project failure may only be 
apparent long after the takings when public sentiment has moved on to 
                                                                                                                          
118 Poletown Neighborhood Council, 304 N.W.2d at 470–71 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting). The 
prospect of the new General Motors factory was undoubtedly popular in the Detroit metropolitan area. 
Along with the factory came the promise of jobs—6,150 according to GM executives—at a time when 
the unemployment rate was approximately fourteen percent in Michigan and eighteen percent in 
Detroit. Id. at 465, 467.   
119 Id. at 482. 
120 See Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic 
Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1023. 
121 See id. at 1022; see also Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary: 
Condemnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 82–83 (1998) (positing 
landowners’ ability to influence election outcome “is vanishingly small”). 
122 See Somin, supra note 120, at 1022. 
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different policy issues.123 Third, the costs of many economic development 
takings are widely dispersed among the taxpayers, creating little incentive 
for individual taxpayers to oppose specific condemnations.124  
It is not only the powerless minorities, however, who should be 
concerned. The majority’s confidence in the democratic or political process 
to appropriately limit public use and eminent domain also is misplaced 
because of the possibility that local governments will be captured by 
powerful interest groups.125 There are a number of reasons why interest 
groups can easily capture local governments when eminent domain is used 
to promote economic development. One is that the expansive justification 
that economic development provides for the use of eminent domain 
increases the number of groups that can persuade the government to use 
the power.126 Moreover, it creates a vast number of potential projects that 
can utilize eminent domain as a tool for implementation.127 Two, the 
concentrated benefit that results from economic development takings 
creates an incentive to capture the eminent domain process.128 For 
example, the primary beneficiary of the assembly and development of a 
large tract of land would be the developer, who would construct and then 
sell or lease office, retail, and residential space.129 Because developers 
stand to gain from the development of the taken property, they have the 
incentive to persuade local authorities to use eminent domain to implement 
the project.130 Three, special interests, such as corporations, developers, 
                                                                                                                          
123 See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 113–14 n.1 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing in 
a different context “the time lag between when the deprivations are imposed and when their effects are 
felt may diminish the efficacy of this political safeguard”); Somin, supra note 120, at 1022. Professor 
Somin notes that in Poletown the General Motors factory was not completed until four years after the 
takings, which occurred in 1981, and that it was not until the late 1980s that it became clear that the 
factory would not generate the number of promised jobs. Id. at 1022–23. 
124 Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based 
on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2006) (outlining four 
reasons why political process is an ineffective check against use of eminent domain for economic 
development). 
125 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 107, at 547–48; Kelly, supra note 124, at 34–41 (postulating 
eminent domain for economic development creates incentives for private influence in process due to 
concentrated benefit, low cost to private party, and disparity in legal and financial resources); Somin, 
supra note 120, at 1021–23 (identifying three reasons local governments are especially subject to 
capture in economic development takings).   
126 See Somin, supra note 120, at 1021–22. 
127 See id. Professor Somin notes that the greater number of groups that can utilize eminent 
domain under an economic development justification, combined with the greater number of projects 
that can, under such a justification, legitimately utilize the condemnation power, makes eminent 
domain an attractive means for these groups to accomplish their private development objectives. Id. 
128 Kelly, supra note 124, at 34–35.  
129 See id. at 34. 
130 See id. at 34–35. The benefit derived from the use of eminent domain for public uses such as 
roads, parks, and hospitals is juxtaposed with the benefit derived from economic development takings. 
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and the like, that support economic development projects requiring the use 
of eminent domain may have more political influence than condemnees 
because they are repeat players in the political realm.131 Moreover, because 
these politically powerful groups are repeat players, they are already 
organized and have considerable financial resources.132 Four, local 
governments, particularly those in desperate need of economic resurgence, 
are especially susceptible to being enticed by the promise of more jobs and 
increased tax revenue.133 Undoubtedly, these are only a few of the reasons 
politically powerful groups are in a position to co-opt the eminent domain 
process for use in economic development projects.    
Even when the democratic or political process does act as a restraint on 
the use of eminent domain, it is likely the politically influential targets of a 
taking that will be afforded its protection. New London provides a prime 
example. When the municipal development plan at issue in Kelo was 
originally approved, all property and buildings within the Fort Trumbull 
neighborhood were to be condemned and razed. Nevertheless, the Italian 
Dramatic Club, a men’s social club, was able to obtain a modification in 
the plan, allowing its clubhouse to remain.134 Unfortunately, Byron 
Athenian, whose home was located immediately adjacent to the Italian 
Dramatic Club, was unable to secure the same treatment. 
Democracy’s inability to adequately restrain eminent domain abuse, 
combined with a definition of public use that essentially leaves property 
ownership rights subject to the will of the majority or powerful special 
                                                                                                                          
Id. at 34. In the former, the beneficiaries are numerous and dispersed; thus, the incentive to abuse the 
eminent domain process is much less significant. Id.        
131 Kochan, supra note 121, at 82. 
132 See id. at 80–82 (illustrating how information and transaction costs associated with opposing 
legislation benefiting special interests make it cost-prohibitive to fight condemnation decisions); Kelly, 
supra note 124, at 39–41 (noting disparate legal and financial resources between developers and 
homeowners makes it easier for developers to co-opt eminent domain power).   
133 Paul Boudreaux, Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the Solution of Representation 
Reinforcement, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 4, 18 (2005) (“[M]any local governments, especially the cash-
poor central cities, are trying ever harder to raise revenue by attracting businesses and wealthy 
residents . . . thus making an eminent domain an irresistible tool.”); Adam P. Hellegers, Eminent 
Domain as an Economic Development Tool: A Proposal to Reform HUD Displacement Policy, 2001 L. 
REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 901, 905 (arguing local governments are more susceptible to corporate influence 
in economic development decisions, in part, because of competition between localities for jobs). 
Professor Boudreaux observed that eminent domain abuse is driven, in part, by the growing 
competition among governments to attract businesses to their communities. Boudreaux, supra, at 18. 
Due to the excessive demand for a limited number of “attractive and job-creating companies,” cities 
have resorted to the use of eminent domain to “lower the cost of doing business in their communities.” 
Id. at 18–19.   
134 See JEFF BENEDICT, LITTLE PINK HOUSE: A TRUE STORY OF DEFIANCE AND COURAGE 65–66 
(2009). The Italian Dramatic Club was built by Italian immigrants after World War I and originally 
served as an Italian cultural center. Id. By the late 1990s, however, it had become a political power in 
New London. Id. at 66. In fact, when the Italian Dramatic Club was negotiating for its exemption for 
the development plan a state court judge negotiated on the club’s behalf. Id. at 151–53, 163–64.   
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interests are precisely the reasons courts must have a meaningful role in 
reviewing public use determinations and condemnations. Reserving a role 
for the judiciary is not offensive to the separation of powers, nor is it an 
assault on federalism to allow federal courts to protect property owners 
when state legislatures and courts fail to do so, as suggested by Attorneys 
Horton and Levesque.135 Indeed, it is fundamental in our constitutional 
system that the role of the judiciary is to restrain the majority when it 
exceeds the bounds of its authority or transcends the limits of the Bill of 
Rights.136 Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified specifically 
                                                                                                                          
135 See Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1418–19 (arguing federalism should be allowed to 
work by leaving development of eminent domain and public use jurisprudence to state courts); see also 
Brief of the Respondents, supra note 2, at 21–22 (asserting deferring to state legislatures and 
municipalities on economic decisions maintains proper balance between state and federal government). 
136 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
[T]he courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the 
legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned 
to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province 
of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a 
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the 
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should 
happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, . . . the Constitution ought 
to be preferred to the statute . . . . 
. . . [W]here the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to 
that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by 
the latter rather than the former. 
. . . .  
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution 
and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of 
designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate 
among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better 
information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to 
occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the 
minor party in the community . . . . [I]t is not to be inferred from [the principle that 
the Constitution may be amended], that the representatives of the people, whenever 
a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents, 
incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution, would, on that 
account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions . . . .   
But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only, that the 
independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of 
occasional ill humors in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the 
injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial 
laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in 
mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such laws. It not only serves to 
moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it 
operates as a check upon the legislative body in passing them . . . . 
Id.   
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to limit the power of state governments.137 It is a complete disregard of 
these principles to argue that the legislature, limited only by the will of the 
majority, can declare what is a public use, and therefore, when eminent 
domain may be employed, unrestrained by the courts, other than to 
determine whether such decisions are rational and made in good faith.  
Of course, it is argued that in other areas of economic and social 
legislation, despite the judiciary’s duty to protect the minority from the will 
of the majority, courts employ a similar deferential approach. That is, when 
economic or social legislation is challenged it is reviewed under a rational 
basis standard: the challenged law, to withstand judicial scrutiny, must 
only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose. 
Conflating legislation that authorizes the taking of private property with 
general social and economic legislation, however, overlooks a glaring 
difference. The former involves the taking of private property, a power 
limited by the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, and general economic 
and social legislation do not. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In summary, the utilization of the likelihood-of-development test in 
Kelo would have been consistent with Connecticut precedent that 
recognized the need for increased judicial scrutiny when property is taken, 
owned, and put to use by private, rather than public, parties. Further, 
utilization of the test would not have been inconsistent with United States 
Supreme Court precedent. The likelihood-of-development test 
differentiates between the purported use and actual use to which the taken 
property will be put, and simply questions whether the actual use will in 
fact be the purported public use. It does not question the legislative 
judgment that economic development (the purported use in Kelo) is an 
appropriate public use. Moreover, the test does not second guess the City’s 
and the NLDC’s projected increases in jobs and tax revenue. Instead, the 
test merely questions whether there was sufficient evidence to support a 
finding that the development plan would actually be implemented, 
meaning that the hotel and convention center, office space, and residential 
neighborhood would in fact be built.  
Not only would the likelihood-of-development test have been 
consistent with court precedent, but economic development takings are 
distinct from takings previously upheld by the Connecticut and United 
                                                                                                                          
137 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453–55 (1976) (observing congressional action 
under Fourteenth Amendment can abrogate state sovereign immunity because that amendment’s 
ratification limited state power and caused a shift in federal-state balance); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 
(10 Otto) 339, 346 (1879) (holding Congress could prohibit exclusion of people of color from state 
juries under Fourteenth Amendment, noting: “The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are 
directed to the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power.”).  
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States supreme courts. Therefore, there were justifiable and principled 
reasons for holding the taking authority to a more exacting standard of 
judicial scrutiny. Economic development takings should be more closely 
reviewed by the courts because the takings alone do not accomplish a 
public purpose, there is no natural limitation to such takings, and it is not 
necessary that the previous use of the taken property be harmful to the 
public.  
Finally, it is unlikely that the democratic process is a meaningful 
limitation of the eminent domain power. History has demonstrated that 
eminent domain has disproportionately impacted minority, elderly, and 
poor neighborhoods. Moreover, local governments are susceptible to 
capture by powerful interest groups who co-opt the eminent domain 
process for their own private gain. Finally, relying on the democratic 
process to restrain the use of eminent domain only ensures that the 
politically powerful can save their property from condemnation. 
Meanwhile, those without political clout will be left searching for a new 
place to reside or conduct their business.  
There is no better argument for an increased role of the judiciary in the 
context of economic development takings than Kelo itself. First, the taken 
properties in Kelo were not blighted or rundown. In fact, the plaintiffs had 
invested substantial time and money in maintaining their properties. 
Second, the politically powerful Italian Dramatic Club was spared from 
condemnation while the homes and businesses of Susette Kelo and her 
neighbors remained slated for destruction. Third, despite mounting public 
resistance to the Fort Trumbull redevelopment plan, the City and the 
NLDC pressed forward.  
Finally, and most troublingly, ten years after the United States 
Supreme Court upheld the condemnation of the Fort Trumbull 
neighborhood, the property remains barren. As I predicted, the 
development plan never moved forward.138 Today, New London remains a 
                                                                                                                          
138 Attorneys Horton and Levesque would have you believe that the Fort Trumbull development 
plan failed because of the litigation. Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1410. Such a suggestion is 
disingenuous at best. The litigation did not prevent commencement of all development. Both parcels 1 
and 2, where the hotel and conference center and upscale housing were planned, were ready to be 
developed when the litigation first began. Moreover, Pfizer had agreed, prior to the decision in the trial 
court, to subsidize a large number of the hotel rooms. Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 
WL 500238, at *41 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 
2004), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). Thus, the litigation presented no roadblock to building the hotel and 
conference center or the housing. On the other hand, construction of the office space on Parcel 3 was 
not planned to begin until warranted by market conditions. Id. at *67. At the time of trial, however, 
market demand for Class A office space in New London was soft and it was not feasible to begin new 
construction. Id. at *66–67. Additionally, the developer testified that new construction would not begin 
without tenants and at that time there were no tenant commitments. See id. at *67. Considering these 
facts together, it seems much more likely that the development plan failed because it was not 
economically feasible to move forward and the proposed developer was not legally required to do so.     
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distressed municipality.139  
 
                                                                                                                          
139 See Publications: Distressed Municipalities, CT.GOV, http://www.ct.gov/ecd/cwp/view.asp?a= 
1105&q=251248 [https://perma.cc/T82F-DGXM] (follow 2015 “Distressed Municipalities” hyperlink) 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (identifying New London as a distressed municipality). See generally Quick 
Facts: Connecticut, U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/09,09 
52280 [https://perma.cc/TBM8-NSR4] (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). According to the United States 
Census Bureau, the 2010–2014 median household income for New London was $41,230. Id. Over the 
same period, the median household income in Connecticut was significantly higher, $69,899. Id. The 
percentage of individuals living below the federal poverty level was also higher in New London 
relative to Connecticut, 25.3% and 10.8%, respectively. Id. 
